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INTRODUCTION 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM SOUTH ASIA AND AFRICA 
Sudha Setty & Matthew H Charity* 
On January 4, 2014, two sections of the Association of American Law 
Schools (AALS)-the Section on Africa and the Section on Law & South Asian 
Studies-hosted a joint program entitled Constitutional Conflict and Development: 
Perspectives fi'om South Asia and Africa. The ambitious goal of these sections in 
hosting this joint program was to bring together a diverse group of scholars to 
discuss their research on constitutional development, conflict, transition, and 
evolution in nations across South Asia and Africa. Recent revolutions in Tunisia 
and Egypt; constitutional reform effmis in Myanmar (Burma), Kenya, and 
Morocco; and continued constitutional evolution in South Afi'ica, India, and 
Pakistan provide just a few examples of vast and profound constitutional changes 
occurring throughout these regions. We hoped the panel presentations at the AALS 
annual meeting would not only offer new research and insight, but also provoke 
serious discussion among the panelists and audience members as to the 
commonalities and differences among the nations and experiences discussed, as 
well as the processes and the actors represented in the context of defining-
constituting-the nation. We were delighted to find that our goal had been met by 
this group of scholars, who presented work that ranged from advocating for 
federalism-based constitutional refonn in nations with transitional governments to 
discussing the importance of charismatic and dedicated law reformers toward 
constitutionalism. Through the presentations, we gained a sense of the profound 
differences in the constitutional situations, goals, and prospects in each nation 
examined. Further, we began to understand commonalities in the struggle toward 
the rule of law and a separation of powers that would be tolerated by the various 
political and other stakeholders, adequately satisfy the polity, and meet at least 
some of the constitutionalist goals of reformers. 
Gedion Hessebon, in The Fourth Constitution-Making Wave of Africa: 
Constitutions 4. 0?, considers the current constitutional reform process being 
undertaken in Kenya as part of the fourth wave of constitution-making in pmis of 
sub-Saharan Africa. 1 Hessebon grounds his argument in the history of constitution 
* Sudha Setty is Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development & Intellectual 
Life, Western New England University School of Law. Professor Setty was the chair of the 
AALS Section on Law & South Asian Studies at the 2014 AALS annual meeting. Matthew H. 
Charity is Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. Professor Charity 
was the chair of the AALS Section on Africa at the 2014 AALS annual meeting and moderated 
the presentations and discussion during the joint program. 
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making and refonn in several post-colonial sub-Saharan countries and considers 
how the fourth wave of constitution-making accounts for political, social, 
religious, and other fissures in Kenya. Hessebon starts off with the historical 
context of a 1960s post-colonial enviromnent in which the political map of Africa 
was redrawn and constitutions were developed quickly for practical and symbolic 
sovereignty reasons. In this first wave of constitution-making, much like in India 
and Pakistan in the late 1940s after the end of British colonialmle, the form and 
tenor of new sub-Saharan constitutions mimicked in many ways those of the 
withdrawing colonial powers. These constitutions proved to be unstable, giving 
way to military coups d'etat and a second wave of reform that consisted largely of 
amending, repealing, and suspending the initial post-colonial constitutions. The 
late post-Cold War era ushered in the third wave of constitution-making to 
accommodate shifting geopolitical alignment and provide formal 
acknowledgement of human rights obligations, the same era in which South Africa 
broke with its apa1theid government and moved toward progressive constitutional 
design. In the fourth wave, Hessebon sees the potential for more sophisticated 
reform to improve conh·ols over the executive branch, establish better institutional 
elements of horizontal accountability, and allow for some regional autonomy 
through a federalism structure that may reflect etlmic, linguistic, and cultural 
differences in a manner that combats marginalization of minority groups. 
David Mednicoff also grapples with questions of constitutional overhaul and 
design in his paper, A Tale of Three Constitutions: Common Drives and Diverse 
Outcomes in Post-2010 Arab Legal Politics. 2 Mednicoffs analysis focuses on the 
legal and constitutional refonns in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco in the wake of the 
Arab Spring of 2011. These developments took place in systems that previously 
had weak horizontal checks and balances on autocratic leaders, and Mednicoff 
argues that the post-Arab Spring legal reforms were used to both legitimize and 
constrain the power of these leaders. He poses a series of impmtant questions, 
some of which resonate among the other symposium papers. How is power 
decentralized? Does constitutional reform entail a different, more democratic 
sociopolitical order? To what extent should a reformed constitution reflect Islam, 
the religious majority in these nations? At the same time, are constitutions 
reformed in a manner that improves rights protection for those historically 
marginalized, including religious minorities, women, and less powerful social 
groups? Mednicoff concludes that all three nations he surveys have decentralized 
power to some extent, although sometimes in ways that legitimize the core of an 
autocratic order; he also finds that little changed with regard to the constitutional 
treatment of Islam and protection for historically marginalized groups, although he 
sees some potential improvement in the protection of historically marginalized 
groups. Cenh·al to the reform process in Tunisia was the willingness-albeit 
reluctant at times--of parties to compromise on numerous fronts, including the 
strength of checks on the executive, the explicit inclusion of Islamic law and 
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values, and the protections for religious freedom. In Egypt, Mednicoff argues that 
debate over the role of Islam in the constitutional order overtook the political 
process in ways that ultimately led to the restoration of authoritarian politics at the 
hands of the military. In Morocco, the 2011 constitutional redrafting was a 
proactive measure initiated by the monarch to stave off a popular groundswell of 
democratization. Mednicoff contextualizes these reforms in the histmy of 
independent Morocco, in which new constitutions have been promulgated 
regularly not only as a means to meet public demands, but also to reify the power 
of the monarchy. As a result, some federalism-oriented reforms were initiated, 
formal recognition was granted to the indigenous Berber language, women's rights 
were articulated, and, in an unprecedented move, Morocco's Supreme Court was 
authorized to engage in judicial review of executive actions. Whether this power 
will allow for adjudicated contestation of constitutional interpretation is yet to be 
seen. 
Janelle Saffin and Nathan Willis, like Hessebon in his piece, focus on 
federalism-oriented constitutional reform in Need for a Constitutional Settlement 
to Further the Reform Process in Myanmar (Burma).3 The authors consider the 
unworkability of Myanmar's current constitutional order, which has engendered 
political instability and deep mistrust among political stakeholders. The authors 
consider efforts over the last sixty years-fi·om the 1947, 1974, and 2008 
constitutions to the debates of today-to create a durable constitutional system. 
Past efforts, in Saffin and Willis's view, have failed because of structural weakness 
that led to military coups d'etat, a lack of engagement by less powerful 
constituencies, and the wariness of ethnic minorities fearing abuse by the central 
government. The current question, then, is how the Burmese government can 
effectively manage the process of reform to achieve constitutional settlement that 
engages the populace, satisfies military stakeholders, and accounts for ethnic and 
religious minorities. As in Stephen Ellmann's reflection on the importance of 
individuals committed to constitutional refonn in South Afi·ica, discussed infra, 
Saffin and Willis note the importance of leaders such as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in 
generating pressure toward constitutional reform, both as an outside political 
protester and as a member of govermnent. The authors, seeing some of the same 
potential benefits and potential pitfalls that Hessebon identified in Kenya, 
encourage the Bunnese government toward a political settlement that embraces 
federalism as a possible structural solution that can engage minority populations, 
protect against central government overreach, reduce political manipulation, and, 
hopefully, set the foundation for a shared constitutional identity that would make 
Myanmar more stable and peaceful. 
Maryam Khan, in Genesis and Evolution of Public Interest Litigation in the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan: Toward a Dynamic TheoiJ' of Judicialization, 
considers the role of a supreme court and the judiciary more generally in 
3. Janelle Saffin & Nathan Willis, The Need for a Constitutional Settlement to Further the 
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constitutional development and political constraint.4 Khan considers the rise of 
public interest litigation (PIL), in which third parties, such as non-governmental 
organizations, can file a lawsuit that may be taken up by the court as a matter of 
public interest. Such litigation has been an important means by which matters of 
social justice have been brought before the Pakistani courts and has allowed 
Pakistan's Supreme Court to take a more activist role vis-a-vis executive decision-
making than might otherwise be the case. Khan looks at PIL as part of the longer 
history of judicialization in Pakistan, a process that she sees as dynamic and 
ongoing in relation to political development and turmoil. She offers quantitative 
and qualitative data from 1988 to 2013 to categorize the use of PIL by the 
Pakistani Supreme Court during particular periods of time, thereby allowing us to 
better understand the process of judicialization in the broader context of political 
contestation and interest group mobilization. Khan notes that although the court's 
activism ebbs and flows, the types of PIL cases that the court decides to hear are 
similar over time. Khan argues that the court has characterized certain cases as 
dealing with fundamental rights so as to allow it to exercise its jurisdiction, despite 
the cost of being perceived as anti-democratic, overreaching, or paternalistic 
toward the political branches of government. She concludes from the court's PIL 
record that its judicial activism is dynamic and is based on perceptions of its own 
legitimacy, the level of political turmoil, and the shifting interests of the court and 
its justices, as well as the perceived strength of political stakeholders and the 
populace. 
Manoj Mate's paper, Elite Institutionalism and Judicial Assertiveness in the 
Supreme Court of India,5 touches on some themes similar to those in Khan's 
article, particularly in the use of PIL as pmi of the Indian Supreme Court's 
development of its own constitutional role. Mate draws on field research, including 
interviews with former Supreme Court justices, high court judges, Supreme Court 
advocates, and other legal elites to understand the individual influences that helped 
motivate the Indian Supreme Court's development of its own PIL jurisprudence. 
Mate contextualizes this research in the historical and political turmoil of the post-
Emergency period through the more politically stable 1990s and beyond. He finds 
that, particularly in the years ilmnediately after the Emergency, justices looked to 
involve the court in cases involving ftmdamental rights as a means by which to 
increase the legitimacy and institutional heft of the court as a powerful 
counterweight to an executive branch perceived of gross overreaching and abuse. 
In later years, Mate sees the court as reacting to public and elite opinion on a 
number of issues and confi·onting the political branches more on matters of 
fundamental rights, fi·ee speech, and the right to information, all of which are areas 
in which the populace and Indian elites expected more protection from the court. 
On matters of economic policy, development, and national security, Mate sees 
4. Maryam S. Khan, Genesis and Evolution of Public Interest Litigation in the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan: Toward a Dynamic TheOIJ' of Judicialization, 28 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 
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judicial reticence as a result of genuine concern over the nation's economic future 
and national security, as well as the elite support for neoliberal policies in the 
1990s and beyond. Mate offers the theory of elite institutionalism as a way of 
understanding the selective activism of the court. By considering the justices' 
exposure to a variety of intellectual and professional influences and their concern 
over the institutional development of the court itself, Mate gives us insight as to 
the motivations of individuals in building an institution and developing the 
constitutional path of the nation. 
This brings us to the celebration of Nelson Mandela and Arthur Chaskalson's 
work toward South African constitutionalism in Stephen EHmann's Two South 
Afi·ican Men of the Law.6 EHmann offers us a close look at the work, motivations, 
and aspirations of two leaders in the South African civil rights and constitutional 
movements. EHmann begins with a look at multiple aspects of Nelson Mandela's 
life and his engagement with the law as a practicing lawyer, a leader of a 
revolutionaty movement, and as a constitutional designer and president. He first 
looks at Mandela's work in the 1950s as a cause lawyer representing Africans 
where few others would. He then considers Mandela's outlook as a political 
prisoner tried and convicted by a profoundly structurally-flawed legal system. 
Ellmann emphasizes that even through these experiences, Mandela's belief in the 
possibility of a South Africa governed by a rule of law that was fundamentally fair 
was clear. Ellmann then considers Mandela's work in helping to design and 
implement a progressive, inclusive constitution that embedded the rule of law as a 
guiding principle. EHmann next gives us insight into the life and work of Arthur 
Chaskalson, a contemporary and fi'iend of Mandela who worked within the legal 
system of apartheid-era South Africa toward establishing a more just system of 
government and law. Chaskalson, a vocal opponent of apartheid, was one of 
Mandela's lawyers in the early 1960s and continued to challenge apartheid through 
his legal practice for decades. He was deeply involved in the crafting of the post-
apartheid constitution, looking to provide a platform for the construction of a 
stable, inclusive constitutional democracy. Chaskalson served as a president of 
South Africa's Constitutional Court (later called the chief justice of South Afi·ica) 
in an era in which the court asse1ied itself as a protector of individual rights, using 
international and comparative human rights standards to create a progressive 
jurisprudence on issues including LGBT rights, socioeconomic rights, and the 
unconstitutionality of the death penalty. In some ways, looking at the lives and 
goals of these rather different men helps us understand the very human element at 
the heart of constitutional reform effmis everywhere. Certainly we can see 
parallels in the motivations and aspirations between Mandela and Chaskalson in 
South Africa and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's influence as both a political outsider 
and insider in Myanmar, or the individual judges in Pakistan and India debating 
and considering their constitutional role and responsibility in their nations' 
development. 
6. Stephen Ellmann, Two South Aji'ican Men of the Law, 28 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 431 
(2014). 
184 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. [28.2 
We thank the authors of this symposium issue for giving us the opportunity to 
revisit their dynamic scholarship; they offer us deep insight into individual issues 
of constitutional conflict, evolution, and reform in each of the different nations 
they study. In presenting their work as a group, they also helped attendees at the 
2014 AALS joint program and readers here to better understand some of the 
cmmnonalities of these very different nations and regions with regard to 
constitutional development, the role of the judiciary and law reformers, the 
challenges of constitutional bargaining and compromise, and the work in each 
nation toward a stable constitutional order premised on the rule of law. 
